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Would a hypothetical merger between Peru’s two largest 
newspaper conglomerates have been cleared? A two-sided multi-
media analysis 
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This study uses an original data set on the Peruvian media sectors to analyze the 
effect that the association between the two largest newspaper conglomerates 
would have on the content and advertising markets. This case is particularly 
relevant given the particularities of Peru’s competition framework and media 
markets. Using survey data, we conclude that Peruvian newspapers face effective 
competition from other media sectors in both the content and advertising markets. 
Our analysis shows that both markets are “unconcentrated” according to the U.S. 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines and thus, the operation would be cleared. However, 
if concentration is analyzed taking into account only news-providing media and 
programs, the market would be categorized as “moderately concentrated” and a 
full merger between these conglomerates would warrant further scrutiny.  
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Using an original data set on the Peruvian media markets, this paper analyzes the 
effects on the content and advertising markets of an association between the two 
largest conglomerates in the Peruvian newspaper market: El Comercio and 
EPENSA. In 2012 they represented 47.1% and 27% of average daily sales, 
respectively. This association takes the form of a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA), 
an arrangement considered in the US Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970 under 
which newspapers combine their advertising and subscription operations while 
maintaining independent editorial lines and news divisions (Romeo, Pittman and 
Familant. 2003). 
The El Comercio/EPENSA association was surrounded by controversy, among 
other reasons, because La República group, the third largest player in the market, 
was on the verge of closing a deal to purchase 54% of EPENSA’s shares. This deal, 
however, was rejected when EPENSA’s minority shareholders exercised their right 
of first refusal and bought the stake that La República was about to acquire. They 
immediately separated the editorial and commercial areas into independent 
companies and sold 54% of the latter to El Comercio Group.  
Right after the deal was completed, La República launched a massive campaign to 
oppose it, which sparked a public debate about media concentration that has not 
settled yet. The La República’s director and main shareholder and a group of 
independent journalists tried to block the deal in the Judiciary arguing that it was 
unconstitutional as the Peruvian Constitution forbids the monopolization of media. 
The court has not yet decided on the matter, which prompted the demandants to 
elevate the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
This case is particularly relevant given the particularities of Peru’s competition 
framework and media markets. Even though the country has a strong antitrust 
authority empowered to prosecute cartels and deal with abuse of dominance cases, 
mergers need not secure previous approval. Moreover, there is empirical evidence 
that newspapers and other media sectors are substitutes for both content 
consumers and advertisers, and that television and radio are much more 
important than newspapers for information consumers (newspapers’ main 
readers). Furthermore, El Comercio and La República groups, fierce ideological 
rivals in the newspaper market, are partners in a television station with the largest 
audience in the country. This suggests that the analysis of this operation cannot be 
restricted to the newspaper market. 
The following section presents an overview of the relevant literature on media 
mergers. The third explains the particularities of Peru’s media regulatory 
framework and markets, while the fourth analyzes the consequences of El 
Comercio/EPENSA’s association on both the content and advertising markets. The 
fifth section presents the conclusions of the paper. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Media mergers have been widely discussed in academic literature. Unlike those in 
other sectors, these have repercussions not only in the efficiency of the markets 
involved but also in vital aspects of the democratic debate such as freedom of 
speech and information, pluralism of points of view, and citizenship (OECD, 2003). 
In contrast with monopolies, where there is consensus regarding the need for ad-
hoc regulation and price-setting mechanisms by independent supervisory bodies, 
there is no consensus in the economic literature concerning whether and how 
media firms should be regulated. Should they be subject to more restrictive 
regulation than just regular antitrust laws? Should media mergers be blocked if 
they reduce the number of independent voices in the market even when they make 
economic sense? Are media markets in countries with a more restrictive regulation 
more plural than those in countries characterized by a more light-handed 
approach? Evidence does not provide concluding answers to these questions 
either, and it is no surprise to find a significant diversity of regulatory frameworks 
among countries.   
Two relatively recent events add a layer of complexity to the analysis of media 
mergers. First, the decline of the most traditional media industry of all, 
newspapers, mainly due to fierce competition from online competitors (Cho, Smith 
and Zentner, 2016). It is extremely difficult to argue that firms with an increasing 
amount of revenues lost to competitors have the market power to harm 
consumers. Second, the understanding of two-sided markets, an aspect that has 
been brought to the forefront of the analysis after the publication of Parker and 
Van Alstyne’s seminal paper (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2000). Media companies are 
the textbook example of two-sided platforms since they operate in two different 
industries, content and advertising, and obtain revenues from both (Anderson and 
Gabszewicz, 2006). Earlier works, such as those of Furhoff (1973), Gustafsson 
(1978), explain the printed press’ trend towards concentration as a result of the 
‘circulation spiral’: the fact that wider coverage leads to higher advertising rates. 
This dynamics is better understood now as those of a two-sided market.  
Chandra and Kaiser (2015) review several studies that analyze newspapers 
mergers from different points of view. George (2007), for example, examines the 
effect of ownership concentration on product position, product variety and 
circulation in the US daily newspaper market. Counterintuitively, her results show 
that both differentiation and variety increase with ownership concentration. 
Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) study the effects of mergers in the newspaper 
industry using data from a wave of mergers occurred in the newspaper industry of 
Canada in the 1990s. They find that greater concentration did not lead to higher 
prices for either newspaper subscribers or advertisers. 
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Fan (2013) develops a structural model of newspaper markets to analyze the 
effects of ownership consolidation, taking into account not only firms' price 
adjustments but also the changes in newspaper characteristics. She finds that 
taking into account adjustments of product characteristics, such as newspaper 
quality, lead to substantial differences in the estimated effects of mergers. 
Filistrucchi, Klein and Michielsen (2012) compare different methods to assess 
unilateral merger effects in a two-sided market by applying them to a hypothetical 
merger in the Dutch newspaper industry. They find that a higher readership is 
associated with a higher demand for advertising, but also that a higher level of 
advertising leads to a small rise in readership. They also find that the welfare 
effects of the hypothetical merger are small. 
According to Foros, Kind and Sørgard (2015), antitrust authorities have 
traditionally used a one-sided market approach to analyze media mergers. This 
claim is backed by Durand (2008) and Wotton (2007) in their analysis of the 
approach taken by UK competition authorities in the Carlton 
Communications/Granada and Archant/Independent News and Media cases of 
2002 and 2004, respectively. However, this is changing. Both Evans and Noel 
(2008) and Camesasca et al. (2009) provide examples of recent cases where the 
two-sidedness of media has been discussed or taken into account by authorities in 
the U.S. (Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick) and Europe (the acquisition of one of 
the Dutch yellow pages’ publishers by the only other competitor). Filistrucchi et al 
(2014) also provide more recent examples.  
There is no consensus regarding the welfare effects of JOAs. Romeo, Pittman and 
Familant (2003) estimate models of advertising rates for newspapers in 30 large 
US cities and find evidence that JOAs cannot act as unconstrained monopolists 
while setting advertising rates. Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson (2014) argue that 
JOAs lead to a higher economic surplus and diversity since they allow publishers to 
reduce circulation prices in order to increase readership, while Antonielli and 
Filistrucchi (2012) claim that the logic of JOAs is self-defeating, since editorial lines 
converge much more than in the case when newspapers cooperate on their 
editorial lines.  
3. MEDIA MARKETS AND REGULATION IN PERU 
3.1 Media regulatory framework 
As mentioned before, Peru has a strong antitrust authority to deal with cartel and 
abuse of dominance practices but not a merger control regime. This is not casual. 
In 1991, when the first antitrust law was enacted, the country was only starting to 
recover from its most prolonged and devastating economic crisis of the previous 
100 years. The country had been seriously mismanaged in the previous two 
decades by populist governments that run money-losing state-owned enterprises 
in almost every sector (there were even state-owned cinemas), incurred in large 
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fiscal deficits financed by money creation, while at the same time it imposed price 
controls, high import tariffs and export taxes. In 1990, the economy was in 
shambles (hyperinflation surpassed 7,000% that year), subversive groups 
controlled large parts of the territory and Peru was on the verge of becoming a 
failed state. The situation only improved when a new government enacted a series 
of pro-market and fiscally-responsible reforms that curbed inflation, gave the 
Central Bank autonomy and fostered private investment (Paredes and Sachs, 
1991). In that context, creating a regulatory framework that could be perceived as 
one in which the government was interfering with business decisions was 
unthinkable.  
The economic chapter of the current Constitution, enacted in 1993, was inspired 
by the same pro-market principles. The government’s direct intervention in the 
economy is limited and no public institution has the competence to set prices or 
block mergers, with the exception of regulators in four sectors where natural 
monopolies and high-entry barriers prevail: telecommunications, energy, 
transport infrastructure, and water and sanitation. The only sector where a merger 
control regime exists is electricity, since horizontal and vertical mergers could 
distort prices in a market where generation, transmission and distribution 
activities have been segmented. Since 2000, several bills aimed at creating a 
general merger control regime have been presented to Congress, but none has 
passed.  
In the media sector, regulatory constraints to concentration only exist in over-the-
air radio and television. In radio, no firm can be assigned more than 20% of the 
available frequencies within the same band and location. In over-the-air television, 
the limit is 30%. This is explained by the fact that the width of the signal spectrum 
is limited, and a large concentration of frequencies could constitute an 
unsurmountable barrier to entry. However, even in this sector, there is no limit for 
cross ownership of media outlets. 
3.2 The Peruvian media market in 2012 
With 180 years of existence, El Comercio is the most traditional daily newspaper in 
Peru. The group publishes four more newspapers and has diversified interests in 
television, education, entertainment and printing businesses. EPENSA publishes 
four newspapers (‘Correo’ is the flagship) while La República group prints three. 
Both Correo and La República are published under regional editions with high 
levels of readership outside the capital, Lima (where 30% of the population 
resides). Four other companies publish nine national editions and another eight 
print eleven regional newspapers.  
Newspaper sales in Peru reached two million copies in 2012, an annual average 
growth of 8% since 2007. During this period, El Comercio Group’s share grew 
more than 50% due to the success of ‘El Trome’, a paper written in informal 
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language aimed at the base of the pyramid (see Figure 1). ‘El Trome’ is the best-
selling newspaper in the Spanish-speaking world, even outselling others in more 
populated countries such as Spain and Argentina. This newspaper represents two-
thirds of its parent group’s average daily sales.  
Figure 1: Newspaper average daily sales in 2007 and 2012 
 
Source: KPMG (2013) 
In 2012, 60 newspapers circulated in Peru. During the previous 15 years, more 
than 30 printed newspapers entered the Lima market, evidence that barriers to 
entry were low. Several digital-only newspapers have also entered the market. The 
fact that average daily sales of printed newspapers grew by 47% between 2007 
and 2012 and the high growth perspectives of the Peruvian economy probably 
encouraged entry.  
In 2012, newspaper revenues from advertising totaled US$197 million, 23% of all 
media sectors.1 In terms of revenues, the most important medium in the 
advertising market is over-the-air television, which represents almost half of the 
total (see Table 1). It is worth noting that sectors subject to concentration limits 
(over-the-air television and radio) jointly represent almost two-thirds of the total. 
Table 1: Advertising revenues in Peruvian media sectors, 2012 
Medium US$ million Percentage 
Limits to 
concentration 
Over-the-air television  417.85  48.8% Yes 
Newspapers  196.98  23.0% No 
Radio  120.13  14.0% Yes 
Cable television  52.15  6.1% No 
Internet2  37.20  4.3% No 
Magazines  32.38  3.8% No 
Total 856.70 100.0%  
Source: IBOPE Time Peru (2012). Own estimations. 
                                                        
1 Own estimations based on data from IBOPE Time Peru. Gross revenues from printed newspaper 
sales (mostly through kiosks) reached approximately US$180 million in 2012. 
2 Estimation made with the aid of the Peruvian media agencies’ association (AAM). 
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Figure 2 shows market shares (in terms of revenues) within each media sector in 
2012. It is worth noting that El Comercio and La República groups also participate 
in both over-the-air and cable television through America TV, a station 70% owned 
by the former and 30% by the latter. EPENSA and El Comercio Group also 
participate in the magazine business. 
Figure 2: Market shares per conglomerate within media sectors, 2012 
(revenues) 
Source: IBOPE Time Peru (2012) 
4. ESTIMATION AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Methodology 
Media firms participate in both content and advertising markets. To determine if El 
Comercio/EPENSA’s association is detrimental to consumers or advertisers, it is 
necessary to define both markets and analyze the degree of substitution between 
media sectors in each. However, if market definition in two-sided markets is 
troublesome (Filistrucchi et al., op. cit.), it is especially so in media sectors, due to 
rapid technological change, market multiplicity and data scarcity (OECD, op. cit). 
In this study, we have used survey data to determine the degree of substitutability 
between newspapers and other media, a methodological approach consistent with 
those used by competition authorities to analyze substitution between merging 
firms’ products (Foros, Kind and Sørgard, 2015). We have used this approach not 
only because of the impossibility to use the traditional SSNIP (i.e. small but 













































































face no price (over-the-air television and radio, free websites), but also because, in 
our judgement, asking directly to consumers –survey data– provides more reliable 
evidence than estimations based on subjective assumptions and ‘creative’ 
methodologies. The discussion of whether a minute spent consuming news via 
newspapers, television, radio, and the Internet weighs the same, sparked by the 
methodology used by the UK’s media regulator in 2010 to analyze a merger 
proposal with cross-media implications, illustrates this point (Doyle, 2014).3 
Moreover, even though the association between the El Comercio and EPENSA 
groups is limited to the commercialization side of EPENSA’s newspapers and does 
not include their editorial lines nor their news divisions, we have assumed, for the 
sake of the analysis, that a full merger has taken place. This is to fully grasp the 
complexities of operations involving media conglomerates and also to analyze 
what would the consequences be if such hypothetical merger eventually occurs.  
Data have been gathered from several sources: newspaper sales from KPMG (an 
international auditing firm); advertising expenditure in newspapers, television, 
radio and magazines as well as television audience from IBOPE Time Peru; and 
radio audience from CPI (a market research firm based in Lima). Discounts (the 
difference between advertising value provided by IBOPE and what advertisers 
actually pay) was estimated with the aid of El Comercio Group’s marketing staff. 
Information regarding expenditure on Internet, billboards and “Below The Line” 
advertising4 has been estimated with the aid of the Peruvian media agencies’ 
association (AAM).  
4.2 Substitution analysis in the content market 
To determine if other media sector are reasonable substitutes for newspapers’ 
content from the consumers’ point of view, we resort to two surveys made by 
Kantar Media Research (2013) and Ipsos Peru (2014), whose results are presented 
in figures 3 and 4. Even though they differ in coverage and the period of 
consultation,5 both indicate that newspaper readers also consume other media in 
order to obtain information .  
Figure 3 indicates that information is the main reason to read a newspaper, but 
also to watch television. The second reason to read newspapers is entertainment. 
For other media sectors, information-seekers are important although they do not 
represent their main market.  
                                                        
3 According to Doyle (2014), some would argue that because television has more immediacy and 
impact, it deserves a heavier weighting. 
4 Sponsorships, events, tastings and sampling. 
5 The first is representative of Lima and the largest six provincial cities (43% of the country’s 
population and was conducted in 2012 and 2013 while the second is representative of the entire 
country and was conducted in January 2014 (Kantar Media Research, 2013; and Ipsos Peru, 2014). 
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Figure 3: Answers to Survey 1 (Lima and six largest provincial cities) 
Source: Kantar Media Research (2013) 
Figure 4 is more enlightening, since it indicates that this category of consumers not 
only use other media but that they actually resort to television and radio rather 
than newspapers in order to obtain information (only 7% indicate newspapers as 
their main medium to be informed). It also shows that the typical Peruvian news 
consumer hops among television and radio stations, newspapers and Internet 
sites, consuming content from more than one outlet of the same medium. 
 
Figure 4: Answers to Survey 2 (National-wide) 
 
Source: Ipsos Peru (2014) 
It is interesting to note that according to this survey, the Internet seems to be the 
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findings of Cho, Smith and Zentner (2016), whose results indicate that online 
competitors are driving newspapers out of business. This suggests that the 
dynamics of the Peruvian newspaper market is somewhat different to those of the 
ninety-country sample they use.  
4.3 Substitution analysis in the advertising market 
Advertising expenditure in Peru amounted to approximately US$1.1 billion in 
2012,6 almost a 90% increase since 2007.  
The assumption that different media sectors are substitutes for advertisers is less 
controversial among academics. In fact, Seldona, Jewell and O’Brien (2000) have 
already proved it using U.S. beer firm data for three media categories. They find 
evidence of strong substitution possibilities from television advertising into both 
print and radio, from radio into both print and television, and from print into radio. 
Data from the Peruvian market is consistent with their findings. As shown in the 
upper-left panel of Figure 5, three sectors –consumer goods, department stores 
and banking and finance industries– accounted for more than 40% of total 
advertising expenditures in 2012 (the survey covers 22 sectors). The remaining 
three panels show that companies within these three sectors distribute their 
advertising expenditures among all media sectors, a trend replicated in the 
remaining 19 sectors. The relative importance of each media sector depends on the 
industry. 80% of real estate advertising, for example, is made through newspapers, 
but this sector captures less than 1% of beauty products’ advertising.  
                                                        
6 Traditional advertising (newspapers, TV, radio, magazines and the Internet) accounts for 
approximately US$900 million (after discounts). “Below The Line” advertising was estimated in 
around 20%-30% of this amount.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of total advertising expenditure in newspapers, 
television, radio, and magazines, and by the three largest industries, 2012 
Source: IBOPE Time Peru (2012) 
Figure 6 shows that practically all newspaper readers are also exposed to 
advertising from television and billboards. Also, that 87% listen to radio, more 
than half uses the Internet, 45% watches cable television and 10% read a 
magazine.  
Figure 6: Newspaper readers exposed to advertising from other media, 2012 
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4.4 Market definition and estimation 
From the previous section, it can be concluded that: 
1. Newspapers are mainly read for information purposes. 
2. Information seekers not only use media other that newspapers but in fact 
they prefer television and radio over newspapers (only 7% indicate that the 
latter is their main medium to obtain information). 
3. Advertisers distribute their expenditures among newspapers and other 
media. 
4. Newspaper readers are exposed to effective advertising from other media.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that Peruvian newspapers face competition from 
other media sectors in both the content and advertising markets. Excluding them 
from an analysis of the consequences of a merger between newspapers is 
unwarranted as it would distort the analysis of the competitive dynamics of these 
markets and would lead to biased conclusions.  
A further reason to take into account all media sectors when analyzing media 
concentration operations is that El Comercio and La República groups are partners 
in America TV, the television station with the largest audience in the country and 
the third in terms of revenues.  
Since the newspapers published by El Comercio, EPENSA and La República groups 
are distributed nationally, the geographical market encompasses the whole 
country.  
Media markets can be estimated in terms of audience or revenues. Doing it in 
terms of audiences implies methodological complications difficult to overcome, 
since different media sectors measure their audiences differently. Differences are 
demographical (consumers older than 11 years or between 12 and 64), of 
geographical reach (urban national or Lima and the six largest provincial cities), of 
frequency (daily or weekly surveys) and of period (continuous: between March 
2012 and April 2013 or punctual: May 2013).  
Due to these problems, we opted to estimate market shares based on revenues. 
Since some media sectors, such as over-the-air television and radio, are free for 
consumers, it is not possible to estimate the size of the market taking into account 
only revenues obtained from the content market. On the other hand, all media 
firms in Peru obtain revenues from the advertising market. Moreover, these 
revenues are proportional to the reach of each firm, therefore a reasonable 
indicator of the relative importance of each firm.  
Figure 7 shows market shares by media conglomerate in both the content and the 
advertising markets. It can be seen that is the country’s most important in both 
markets is El Comercio Group, with revenues of approximately US$300 million in 
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2012. La República group and EPENSA had approximate revenues of US$57million 
and US$36 million, respectively.  
Figure 7: Market shares per media conglomerate (revenues), 2012 
 
Source: IBOPE Time Peru (2012). Own estimations. 
4.5 Results and discussion 
According to the “Horizontal Merger Guidelines” of the U.S. Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission, a market with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) below 1,500 is considered “unconcentrated”. According to these agencies, 
mergers in these markets involving an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points 
are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily would be cleared 
with no further analysis (U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, 2010). 
Table 2 shows the HHI of Peru’s content and advertising markets before and after 
El Comercio/EPENSA’s association.7 It can be seen that both would be considered 
“unconcentrated” according to the abovementioned guidelines, and that El 
Comercio/EPENSA’s association would increase HHI in less than 100 points, for 
which it would be cleared with no further analysis.  
Table 2: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index before and after El Comercio/EPENSA’s 
association 
 Before  After Increase 
Content market 1,290 1,370 80 
Advertising market 1,083 1,130 47 
 
However, we went farther and estimated market shares in the content market 
taking into account only news-providing media and programs. In this case, only 
advertising revenue from the following categories and programs are considered: 
newspapers: all excluding “popular” and “sport” categories; television and radio: 
news, journalistic and political programs; magazines: only “informative”, and 
                                                        
7 Assuming a full merger between El Comercio and EPENSA 
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Internet: news providing websites (estimated). In this case, HHI is 2,319. Results 
are shown in Figure 8.  
Figure 8: Market shares per media conglomerate considering news-
providing media and programs only (revenues), 2012 
 
Source: IBOPE Time Peru (2012) 
Markets with a HHI between 1,500 and 2,500 are considered to be moderately 
concentrated by U.S. competition authorities. In these, mergers that involve an 
increase in the HHI of more than 100 points would warrant scrutiny because of 
potentially significant competitive concerns. A hypothetical merger of El Comercio 
and EPENSA editorial lines would increase the HHI by 162, from 2,319 to 2,481, 
therefore warranting scrutiny according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  
Would such merger be cleared? It is hard to say. It would depend on other factors 
subjectively considered by antitrust authorities, such as error-prone projections of 
how competition and prices will develop in the future (Kwoka, 2015) or vaguely-
defined non-economic interests of consumers (Van der Burg and Van den Bulck, 
2015); a problem only worsened by the influence media have over public opinion 
and politicians (Doyle, 2014). Moreover, market regulators usually hold 
discretionary powers that facilitate their selection of methodologies that would 
justify a decision in either direction (Defilippi, 2015). The weak institutional 
environment that characterizes emerging economies like Peru makes this decision 
even harder to predict. In any case, it is obvious that it will largely depend on the 
market definition.  
What if we take pluralism into account? If the aim of media merger evaluation 
criteria is to promote pluralism then no concentration operation should be cleared 
since all of them would entail reducing the number of independent voices 
reporting the news. From our point of view, this corollary is unrealistic and shows 
that merger control is hardly the most efficient way to protect pluralism. 
Indeed, the main policy instrument available to foster pluralism is to increase 
access to private and public funding, not prohibiting concentration. The challenge 
resides in how to finance independent voices when they are not profitable enough 





















funding has to come from the inefficiency of maintaining separate cost structures 
when it is more reasonable putting them together. Arguably, subsidies or space in 
state-owned media for independent news organizations would be much more 
transparent and efficient ways to achieve the same goal. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that media outlets do not choose consumers 
but that consumers choose news providers better aligned with their view of the 
world (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). Concentration is then the consequence of 
large segments of consumers identifying themselves with a small number of news 
providers, a situation that will not change by governments maintaining in the 
market providers of information that consumers show little interest for. From our 
point of view, it is very difficult to argue that this is in the best interest of the public 
when the public, with their behavior, is revealing no interest in funding them. We 
acknowledge, however, that this discussion belongs more to the political than to 
the economic realm. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study uses an original data set on Peruvian media to analyze the effect an 
association between the two largest conglomerates in the newspaper market 
would have on the content and advertising markets. This case is particularly 
relevant given the particularities of Peru’s competition framework and media 
markets.  
We use two surveys to determine substitutability between newspapers and other 
media. From them, it can be concluded that: (i) newspapers are mostly read for 
information purposes (entertainment is the second reason); (ii) information 
seekers not only use other media sectors but they prefer television and radio over 
newspapers: (iii) advertisers distribute their expenditures among newspapers and 
other media; and, (iv) newspaper readers are exposed to effective advertising from 
other media. Therefore, it can be drawn the conclusion that Peruvian newspapers 
face competition from other media in both the content and advertising markets.  
Our quantitative analysis shows that both markets can be classified as 
“unconcentrated” according to the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines and that El 
Comercio/EPENSA’s association would increase the HHI in less than 100 points. 
This implies that this operation would be cleared without further analysis by 
antitrust authorities using similar guidelines. 
We went farther and estimated market shares in the content market taking into 
account only news-providing media and programs. In this case, the estimated HHI 
is 2,319 and a hypothetical merger of El Comercio and EPENSA editorial lines 
would increase HHI by 162 to 2,481, therefore warranting scrutiny according to 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In that case, it is difficult to assess whether such 
merger would be cleared, since it would depend on other factors subjectively 
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